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HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RIGHTS: A NEW
NATURAL LAW THEORY PERSPECTIVE
SAMUEL GREGG*
INTRODUCTION
The health care debate that dominated American political
discussion throughout 2009 and early 2010 was about many
things, but one of its more prominent philosophical features
concerned the question of whether there is a "right to health
care." Some advocates of the Obama Administration's health
care legislation insisted that it was reasonable to describe health
care as a "right."' Opponents expressed skepticism about the
validity of this claim. In part this reflected the important role
that the language of rights has assumed in modern political dis-
course. Not everyone regards this development as being without
its own blemishes. In 1991, for example, the Harvard legal phi-
losopher Mary Ann Glendon commented that it had become
very difficult to analyze or debate any controversial question of
law or policy without invoking the concept of rights. The ostensi-
ble advantage of rights discourse, she maintained, was that it had
the potential to provide a common language for exploring, and
perhaps even resolving a range of issues.' Nevertheless, Glendon
added:
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness promotes unrealistic
expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dia-
logue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation,
or at least the discovery of common ground. In its silence
concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone accept-
ance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare
state, without accepting the corresponding personal and
civic obligations. ... In its insularity, it shuts out potentially
important aids to the process of self-correcting learning.
* D.Phil. (Oxon.), is the Director of Research at the Acton Institute and
author of, among other books, ON ORDERED LIBERTY (2003), THE COMMERCIAL
SOCIETY (2007), THE MODERN PAPACY (2009), and WILHELM ROPKE'S POLITICAL
EcoNow (2010).
1. See, e.g., Bernie Sanders, Health Care Is a Right, Not a Privilege, THE HuF-
FINGTON POST (June 28, 2009, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-
bernie-sanders/health-care-is-a-right-no_b_212770.html.
2. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLIrI-
CAL DISCOURSE 4 (1991).
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All of these traits promote mere assertion over reason-
giving.3
From this standpoint, we might partly understand the contempo-
rary invocation of rights as part of a calculated political effort to
shut down discussion (especially when people appear unable to
convince others of the correctness of their argument) and force
political and legal acceptance of all the claims embodied in the
asserted right. In theoretical terms, it also reflects a widespread
understanding of rights as "trumps," to use Ronald Dworkin's
famous metaphor,' which override non-rights-based claims, even
if the latter arguably have strong normative content. In itself,
however, rights-as-trumps cannot resolve the question of how we
adjudicate between claims based upon different rights.
While abuse of a concept such as rights is regrettable, such
misuse does not necessarily undermine the validity of rights or
the potential of rights discourse to elucidate many difficult moral
and policy questions. This is especially true if we can discern a
basis for rights that goes beyond either utilitarian premises
(which have proved unable to sustain any sufficiently stable con-
cept of rights)' or positive law (which implies that rights are ulti-
mately determined by government fiat).' A prominent
alternative to utilitarian and positivist approaches are those theo-
ries that belong to the various schools of "natural law." Natural
law thinkers disagree among themselves on many policy matters.
Nor do they agree about the precise logic to follow in correctly
identifying rights. Nonetheless they all approach rights by
reflecting on questions such as the nature of rationality, free will,
human action, and human moral flourishing.
Modern manifestations of such thinking embrace a range of
figures such as Francisco Suarez, Domingo de Soto, Hugo Gro-
tius, and Samuel von Pufendorf, and, in more recent decades,
scholars such as Jacques Maritain, Heinrich Rommen, Joseph
H6ffner, Martin Rhonheimer, and Alasdair MacIntyre. Over the
past thirty years, the new natural law theory ("NNLT") or new
classical natural law theory (most notably associated with John
Finnis, Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and Robert P. George)'
3. Id. at 14.
4. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights As Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jer-
emy Waldron ed., 1984).
5. See SAMUEL GREGG, ON ORDERED LIBERrw: A TREATISE ON THE FREE Soci-
ETY 82 (2003).
6. Id. at 64-65.
7. See, e.g.,JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RiGHTS (1980) [here-
inafter NATURAL LAw]; ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw (1999);
Joseph Boyle, Free Choice, Incommensurable Goods, and the Self-Refutation of Deter-
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has emerged as an influential school of natural law thought,
partly because of its effort to articulate a fresh understanding of
the origin, character, and limits of rights. The purpose of this
paper is to explore whether, from an NNLT standpoint,8 there
are rights associated with health care, to identify what species of
rights they might be, and to outline the primary principles that
ought to guide efforts to realize such rights.
DISCERNING RIGHTS: NNLT, HUMAN ACTION, AND
FUNDAMENTAL GOODS
NNLT begins with the observation that all human beings
act. Our reason and experience confirm this. Human acts are a
clear manifestation of each individual's unity of mind and body.
When we act, we understand that our bodies are not types of
instruments at the mind's disposal and direction. Human acts
prove that we are not disembodied creatures. They demonstrate
our essential unity, in all our complexity, as persons. Once, how-
ever, we consider the question of what causes us to act, we imme-
diately enter into a debate that has long dominated
philosophical discussion. On one side are those such as Thomas
Hobbes and David Hume who maintain that while humans pos-
sess reason, it is instrumental in character. Hobbes insisted, for
example, that "the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies,
to range abroad and find the way to the things desired."' If Hob-
bes and Hume are right, then it is impossible for people to know
the proper ends of human choice and action through reason.
Instead our reason is, as Hume put it, the slave of our passions
and purely instrumental in character.' 0
NNLT, by contrast, maintains we can make free choices to
the extent that we understand and act upon reasons that are not
reducible to the emotions." Certainly emotions are important
to the moral life. The felt strength of an emotion, for instance,
minism, 50 AM.J.JURIS. 139 (2005); Germain Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23
AM. J. Juius. 21 (1978); Germain Grisez, The First Principle of Practical Reason: A
Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 10 NAT. L.F. 168 (1965).
8. This paper does not engage the debate about the new classical natural
law theory. This is addressed in numerous studies. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note
7; RUSSELL HrITrINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAw THEORY (1987);
John Finnis & Germain Grisez, The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to
Ralph McInerny, 26 AM. J. Jums. 21 (1981); Ralph McInerny, The Principles of
Natural Law, 25 AM. J. Julus. 1 (1980).
9. THOMAS HoBBEs, LEVIATHAN pt. 1, ch. VIII, at 4 (Edwin Curley ed.,
Hackett Publishing 1994) (1651).
10. DAVID HUME, A TREAISE ON HUMAN NATURE bk. 2, pt. 3, § III, at 415
(L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1951) (1739-40).
11. GEORGE, supra note 7, at 126.
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can be a sign of one's commitment to good reasons to act. Aqui-
nas observed that it is sometimes the case that "[d]istorted lusts
are opposed to right reason, healthy lusts to wrong reason." 2 It
is also true that reason has an instrumental dimension. Reason
allows us, for example, to resolve medical problems. But reason
also tells us that trying to solve medical questions is good in itself
because promoting and protecting health is a self-evident reason
for action that requires no further explanation. A choice for
good health is thus an integral element of human flourishing.
Who, after all, could reasonably desire ill health?
This idea is at the root of NNLT's vision of free choice-that
is, of human intelligence in action. This is a person's will work-
ing as an intelligent response to what he comprehends as an
opportunity for action." The source of human actions, their
motivation, are reasons-that is, something intelligible. Accord-
ing to Finnis, people make free choices when-having judged
that they have a reason or reasons to agree to one possible act,
and a reason or reasons to adopt alternative but opposing
options for action-they choose one option instead of the
others." We thus act freely when we understand that an action is
reasonable and seek to establish a concordance between such
reasons and ourselves. Once the person formally chooses the
possibility, it becomes a plan for action. Putting this into effect is
what Aquinas calls "command" [imperium].1 Free choice, from
this perspective is, first, the contemplation of possibilities that
provide reasons for action; second, the active determination of
the value of the object of a possible act; and lastly, the active will-
ing of that act.1 6 We cannot, therefore, understand such acts as
resulting from the inscrutable workings of emotions or biology.
Rather, it is reason that guides the will, for nothing may be the
object of our will unless it is known.
But are the objects of human action solely exterior for
human beings? Aristotle understood that human action has an
12. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE pt. II-II, q. 155, art. 1, at 5
(Blackfiiars ed. 1972) (1271).
13. "For will belongs to the intellectual order .... For 'understanding' as
such, i.e., the act of intellection, which is moved in a way by an intelligible
object, 'is the principle desire.'" THOMAs AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON ARIS-
TOTLE'S METAPHYSIcs bk. XII, lesson 7, at 802 (John P. Rowan trans., Dumb Ox
Books 1995) [hereinafter METAPHYSICS].
14. See JOHN FINNIs, AQUINAS: MORAL, LEGAL, AND POLITIcAL THEORY
63-78 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) [Hereinafter PoLiTicAL THEORY].
15. THOMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE Pt. I-II, q. 17, art. 1, at 182-85
(Blackfriars ed. 1966) (1271).
16. For a more detailed differentiation, see POLITIcAL THEORY, supra note
14, at 71.
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inner significance for man. The definitive point of human activ-
ity, he held, is the act itself.1 7 Likewise, NNLT holds that freely
chosen actions shape not only the external world, but also the
actor himself, giving moral definition to that person. We may
describe this difference in terms of the transitive and intransitive
dimensions of human acts. Aquinas explained this in the follow-
ing way:
There are two types of action. One proceeds from the
agent and goes out to an exterior thing, which it
changes. . . . [This] can properly be called an action
[actio]. The second type of action does not go out to an
exterior thing but remains in the agent as its perfection.
Properly speaking, this is called operation [operatio] .
The transitive (external) effect of an act is what occurs outside us
as a result of the action. But the intransitive effect of the same
act leaves an inner mark on us. While this may not be at the
forefront of our minds when we make choices, it is an unavoida-
ble effect of any freely chosen act. This choice lasts within us
until we decide to act in a way incompatible with that choice. We
thus shape ourselves through our free choices.
The coherence of this understanding of human action
depends very much upon what we understand to be a reason for
action, or what NNLT calls a "basic good."" In NNLT, basic
goods are fundamental reasons for human action that require no
other reference to another object or purpose because our reason
tells us that they are in themselves good for man 20-intrinsic ele-
ments that inform us of what we are as human persons. They dif-
fer from those intelligible goods that are essentially instrumental
rather than basic. People exercise, for example, to reduce exces-
sive weight. Losing excessive weight is a good reason for acting.
But it is only intelligibly good because it contributes to being
17. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 180 (Christopher Rowe trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (c. 350 BCE).
18. THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 TRUTH 344 (Robert W. Mulligan, S. J., trans.,
Henry Regnery Company 1952).
19. This section follows closely the respective accounts of GERMAIN GRISEZ
& RUSSELL SHAw, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY- THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREE-
DOM 64-74 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1974) and NATURAL LAw, supra note 7,
at 60-99.
20. Aquinas explained the self-evident nature of these reasons for action
in the following manner: "The reason is that a concupiscible good, which is not
an intelligible good, is merely an apparent good; but the first good 'must be an
object of will,' i.e., an object desired by intellectual appetite. For will belongs to
the intellectual order and not merely to that of concupiscible appetite. . . . But
what is desired by intellectual appetite is desired because it seems to be good in
itself." METAPHYSICS, supra note 13, at bk. XII, lesson 7, n.2522, at 802.
2011] 467
468 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25
healthy and staying alive." The free choice to engage in exercise
thus presupposes that human life is a fundamental good to be
promoted and protected. 2 Life-and good health-is therefore
an ultimate reason for a choice. Here, Germain Grisez offers the
important clarification that health as a basic good is not a sensi-
ble good in the sense of feeling well or free from pain. While
health does include these dimensions, it embraces more broadly
the functioning of humans as "integrated, psychosomatic wholes.
Health is functioning that tends towards growth in maturity, the
ability to reproduce, and continuing survival. Its contrary is
organic and/or psychic functioning that tends toward stunted
growth, the inability to have and raise offspring, and death.""
Other basic or fundamental goods include friendship,
knowledge of truth, aesthetic experience, and skillful perform-
ance in work or play.2 4 These fundamental goods are also "com-
mon goods" insofar as they can be participated in innumerable
ways by infinite numbers of persons. This does not mean that we
are obliged to participate in every one of these goods in any one
of our freely chosen actions. This is impossible. We cannot, for
instance, simultaneously study (the good of knowledge) while
running a marathon (the good of skillful performance). NNLT
acknowledges that our choice of one good over another inevita-
bly means we do not participate in other goods through that par-
ticular choice. This is an unintended side effect: we foresee that
it will result from our action but we do not choose it. On the
other hand, we can choose ends that directly violate other basic
goods. The Nazi doctor who conducts experiments on prisoners
in Auschwitz without their consent and without anesthetic may
perform his experiment skillfully. He might even believe he is
pursuing the good of knowledge. In doing so, however, the doc-
tor violates the good of life and health. No matter how much
new information is yielded through the operation or how skill-
fully the doctor conducts an operation without anesthetic upon a
prisoner, his action directly and intentionally contributes to the
destruction of life and/or the severe undermining of health.
This renders his action unreasonable and directly promotes the
doctor's moral disintegration.
21. See GRISEZ & SHAW, supra note 19, at 79-84.
22. In some instances, the choice of a basic good can also help realize
other basic goods. The good of life, for example, also permits people to care
for friends and meet other commitments.
23. Germain Grisez, Health Care as Part of a Christian's Vocation, in IssuEs
FOR A CATHOLIC BIoETHIc 151, 153 (Luke Gormally ed., 1999).
24. See NATURAL LAw, supra note 7, at 85-90.
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HEALTH, THE COMMON GOOD, AND RIGHTS
Health is thus, from an NNLT standpoint, a fundamental
good-a self-evident reason for action. The question of how to
facilitate participation in the good of health in the conditions of
human society is, however, more complicated. First, human
beings are inherently social creatures in ways that animals are
not. There are consequently limits on our capacity for self-reli-
ance and therefore our ability to pursue the good of health and
other fundamental goods by ourselves. Second, some people will
make unreasonable choices that damage their health, the health
of others, and other fundamental goods. This creates challenges
for the human community. Third, although many people will
make perfectly reasonable choices to participate in different
combinations of the basic goods, including the good of health,
some of these individuals' reasonable choices will be incompati-
ble with other individuals' equally reasonable choices.
Private action, rather than state intervention, may offer the
best resolution to many of these dilemmas. A family, for
instance, can resolve many such conflicts among its members.
NNLT theory acknowledges, however, that there are occasions
when the need exists for an organization to resolve many such
disputes in a formal and authoritative manner for all members of
a society. The requirement for such a community becomes more
evident as the range of different, sometimes incompatible, pos-
sibilities for reasonable choice by individuals and associations
continue to expand, thereby making it increasingly difficult to
reconcile all choices with each other. This consequently requires
decisions concerning the processes, rules, and policies that
simultaneously: (1) allow different reasonable choices to be rec-
onciled in a reasonable manner and (2) address problems aris-
ing from unreasonable choices. At the same time, NNLT is clear
that our flourishing remains vitally dependent upon our capacity
and scope to make truly free choices. Hence, NNLT holds that
there are limits upon: (1) the extent to which others should assist
us and (2) the authority that we may confer upon any one com-
munity-including the state-to help coordinate literally mil-
lions of unreasonable and reasonable choices.
NNLT holds that the idea of rights can help guide the politi-
cal community's efforts to reconcile its members' choices.
25
Contemporary rights-talk centers primarily on the presumed
existence of an association between two or more people. To this
extent, recognition of a right means that someone has a duty to
25. Id. at 218-219.
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another. Others, however, are unsure if this tells us much. Lloyd
Weinreb comments, for example, "[t]hat there is a connection
between rights and responsibilities is .. . intuitively obvious, but
any such intuition fails to disclose its source."" From an NNLT
perspective, identifying such a source involves remembering that
to respect human rights involves recognizing that humans have
reason and free will; they are thus capable of knowing the funda-
mental goods that provide reasons for action, as well as of making
choices that facilitate integral human flourishing. We also know
that if people are to have any possibility of engaging in such
flourishing, then certain minimal conditions must exist. Once
we establish that a certain protection or entitlement is required
for any person to have any possibility of choosing one or more of
the basic goods, we may begin to speak of this essential condition
as a right. Indeed, when we situate such rights within a given
political community, then, as Finnis observes, they amount to an
outline of a political community's "common good."" In short,
they describe those conditions that must prevail in a political
community if people in that society are to be able to choose
freely to participate in the basic goods, which lead to integral
human flourishing.
The state's recognition of such rights does appear to have
the potential to resolve some of the problems of coordinating
millions of reasonable and unreasonable choices. The religious
believer, for example, will regard the state's recognition and pro-
tection of the right of religious liberty as reflecting and protect-
ing his freedom to fulfill his duties toward God. Nevertheless,
the same juridical protection of religious liberty as a right means
that the state cannot force the non-believer to worship anyone or
anything. The same civil recognition of a right of religious lib-
erty thus confers upon believer and non-believer alike certain
protections from state coercion regardless of their actual beliefs,
while simultaneously enhancing the ability of the believer and
non-believer to participate in the good of religion (understood
as the good of contemplating whether or not there is an ultimate
transcendent source of good that provides a compelling explana-
tion of life and then ordering one's life accordingly).
The concept of rights as essential features of the political
common good acquires further credence once we recognize how
violating a person's rights damages the political community's
common good. If, for example, a person's right to life is violated
26. Lloyd Weinreb, Natural Law and Rights, in NATURAL LAw THEORY'
CONTEMPORARY EssAYs 278, 286 (Robert P. George ed., 1994).
27. See NATURAL LAw, supra note 7, at 214.
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by another's intentional act to kill that individual, the common
good is undermined. The damage consists of diminishing
others' confidence that the safety of their life is relatively guaran-
teed. Without the legal protection of human life, many people
will be afraid, for instance, to work or engage in more than
superficial relationships with others. Such circumstances in turn
severely hinder our ability to make free choices from a range of
reasonable options.
HEALTH AND RIGHTS: NEGATIVE AND PosITrVE
If, as NNLT holds, health is a basic good, and basic goods
are the foundation of rights recognized, protected, and/or pro-
moted by the state, then how might health-as-a-fundamental-
good translate into the language and logic of rights? Here, it is
worth recalling that there is finiteness to people's participation
in human health as a good in the sense that everyone's health
eventually fails, resulting in death.28 Disease and old age even
ravage the capacity of many to act in accordance with practical
reason. Despite some people's very best efforts to live healthy
lives and the high level of health care available to many, individ-
ual extinction ultimately confronts us all, an impasse which ren-
ders impossible any further flourishing on our part in this world.
From that standpoint, we already begin to see that expressions
such as "a right to health" and "a right to health care" require
significant qualification.
Yet despite this limitation, it is possible to argue that health
as a fundamental good does give rise to certain types of rights.
The most obvious of these is a species of negative rights associated
with health insofar as others have a duty not to intentionally
damage our health. Thus the parent who chooses to deny a child
food in order to have more resources to spend on, for example,
gambling or entertainment, infringes this right. So too does a
doctor who intentionally prescribes his or her patients with the
wrong medicine in order to "see what happens." Likewise, a per-
son who steals his ailing parent's vital medicine in order to sell it
and use the proceeds to buy recreational drugs compounds the
wrongness of his act of theft by directly putting his parent's
health at risk. In such instances, it is reasonable for the state to
act directly to deter and punish such actions, not least because of
the grave damage that permitting such actions does to the com-
mon good.
28. This finiteness is true of all the other fundamental goods. At some
point, for instance, everyone's capacity to engage in skillful performance will
begin to disintegrate.
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When it comes, however, to positive rights that might arise
from health as a fundamental good, the trajectory is less immedi-
ately clear. Inasmuch as members of a given political community
have a responsibility towards the common good-understood as
the conditions that facilitate the flourishing of each and every
one of the community's members-each of us have some positive
duties to the health care of all the community's members. Some-
times these duties are very clear. A person who, for example,
comes across someone who has been hit by a car in the street
normally has a positive duty to render some assistance to the
injured person. Likewise, parents have a positive duty to provide
their children and family with their health care needs consistent
with the use of family resources to promote participation in
other goods.29
But, we inevitably ask, precisely what and how much does
everyone in a given political community owe to everyone else
when it comes to their often very different and changing health
care needs? Must, for instance, a family sacrifice everything to
provide a very elderly relative with a particular treatment that has
a two percent success rate, even if it involves destroying that fam-
ily's ability to materially support its other members' participation
in other goods? What does someone living in New Jersey owe to
the alcoholic in California whose own actions have directly con-
tributed to the destruction of his health? This is further compli-
cated by: (1) the practical fact of a scarcity of resources in any
community, (2) the need for the same resources to serve as a
means for people to participate in other goods besides health,
and (3) the inevitability that death comes to everyone. In short,
while it is possible to affirm "a right to health care," there are
many complex prudential questions that the mere assertion or
even a well-founded recognition of a right to health care cannot
resolve.
NNLT itself recognizes such difficulties of delineating the
respective roles of individuals, families, intermediate associa-
tions, and the state when it comes to actualizing any positive
right. Finnis and George discuss this in the context of consider-
ing the derivation of positive law from the natural law.so Follow-
ing Aquinas, they argue there are two ways in which this occurs.
The first is relatively direct: the recognition of health as a basic
good, for instance, prohibits intentional violations of human
29. For NNLT's explanation of how practical reason guides a person's
participation in the fundamental goods, see NATuRAL LAw, supra note 7, at
100-27.
30. See NATURAL LAw, supra note 7, at 284-90.
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health by others. The second, however, is not so direct. George
points out that the duty to protect health tells us that we need,
for example, some system of traffic regulation so as to protect in
a proactive fashion (rather than in simply a prohibitive manner)
the health of drivers, passengers, and pedestrians. Reflection on
the same duty to protect health, however, cannot determine the
perfect or ideal system of traffic regulation. Such consideration
cannot tell us whether it is better to drive on the left or the
right."
More generally, there is a positive right to health care.
Humans enjoy a high degree of creativity within the parameters
of a certain framework when it comes to giving practical effect to
a positive health care right. In George's words, "[a] number of
different schemes-bearing different and often incommensura-
ble costs and benefits, risks and advantages-are consistent with
the natural law." 2 This means that instead of seeking to deduce
policies that attempt to give direct effect to a positive right to
health care, legislators and policy-makers must engage in an
activity of the practical intellect of the type that Aquinas called
determinatio" While the policy-maker cannot identify an ideal
system of providing health care that is uniquely correct, he can
identify a number of options that meet the test of right reason,
even if some of the options may be somewhat incompatible with
each other. To illustrate the point, George uses the example of
an architect designing a building.3 4 Even assuming basic usabil-
ity and safety, and that certain structural elements (such as roofs
or doors of a certain height) are in place, a number of accept-
able, albeit sometimes incompatible, options for designing the
building exist." The same is true for realizing positive rights to
health care. In practical terms, this means that while, from an
NNLT position, we can certainly identify policies that violate the
framework underlying a positive right to health care, no one can
claim that their particular policy is uniquely correct in their capac-
ity to promote such rights.
LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND SUBSIDIAR=TY
Though the question of actualizing a positive right to health
care falls into the sphere of determinatio, NNLT does provide us
31. See GEORGE, supra note 7, at 108.
32. Id.
33. See THOMAS AQUINAs, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE pt. I-II, q. 95, art. 2, at
104-07 (Blackfriars ed. 1970) (1271).
34. See GEORGE, supra note 7, at 108-09.
35. Id. at 109.
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with principles that help identify those instantiations consistent
with the promotion of human flourishing and the common
good, and those inconsistent with these objectives. One such fil-
ter is the inherent limits that ought to bind the activity of the
state, which arise from a proper understanding of the nature of
the political community and the particular common good it
seeks to serve. In short, the activities of the political commu-
nity-and, more specifically, the legitimate political authorities-
are themselves limited by the rationale for a political community,
which is to serve the common good of that community.
A particular characteristic of the political community's com-
mon good is that it is not the all-inclusive end of its members.
Rather, NNLT holds that it is instrumental as it assists the flourish-
ing of persons by fostering the conditions that facilitate-as
opposed to try and directly realize-the free choice of its mem-
bers to participate in the basic goods and thus engage in human
flourishing. In this sense, Finnis argues, the government serves
"a common good which is instrumental, not itself basic."" The
state's ways of serving this end might include, among others,
interacting with other political communities, protecting its mem-
bers from hostile outsiders, vindicating justice by punishing
wrongdoers, and defining the responsibilities associated with par-
ticular relationships, such as contractual duties. What these activ-
ities have in common is that they are all conditions that assist-as
distinct from directly cause-people to achieve self-mastery. It is
harder, for example, to choose to pursue the good of knowledge
in a situation of civil disorder. Likewise, we know that the incen-
tives for us to work are radically diminished if there is no guaran-
tee that others or the state will not arbitrarily confiscate our
earnings.
The political community's common good thus helps us to
define its legitimate authority and limit it. This translates into
the state playing a coordination role with regard to (1) those
communities, such as families and religious associations, which
directly instantiate particular basic goods by virtue of their very
existence and functioning, and (2) other forms of association,
such as business enterprises, whose primary focus as a commu-
nity is the realization of instrumental goods, such as wealth. But
precisely because the state exists to facilitate an instrumental
good-the political common good-there are limits upon the
extent to which it can act. The state itself cannot make a free
36. SeeJohn Finnis, Is Natural Law Compatible with Limited Government?, in
NATURAL LAw, LIBERALISM, AND MoRALT 5 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
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choice on the part of a person or group of persons to participate
in one or more of the basic goods.
One expression of this understanding of the limited nature
and scope of state power comes through the concept of sub-
sidiarity. The word itself is derived from the Latin subsidium,
meaning assistance. Aquinas partially formulated this idea when
he commented that it is contrary to the proper character of the
state's government to impede people from acting according to
their responsibilities-except in emergencies." NNLT identifies
a fuller explanation of subsidiarity in modern Catholic social
teaching, such as the definition John Paul II offers in his 1991
encyclical Centesimus Annus. He states:
[A] community of a higher order should not interfere in
the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving
the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in
case of need and help to coordinate its activity with the
activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the
common good.3 8
In the same encyclical, John Paul II also insists that:
Such supplementary interventions, which are justified by
urgent reasons touching the common good, must be as
brief as possible, so as to avoid removing permanently from
society and business systems the functions which are prop-
erly theirs, and so as to avoid enlarging excessively the
sphere of State intervention to the detriment of both eco-
nomic and civil freedom.3 9
Higher communities, such as the state, should intervene in
the activities of lower bodies therefore with reference to the com-
mon good-that is, the conditions that enable all persons to ful-
fill themselves. Subsidiarity thus combines axioms of non-
interference and assistance. It follows that when a case of assistance
and coordination through law or the government proves neces-
sary, the assisting community should accord as much respect as
possible to the rightful autonomy of the assisted person or
community.
The primary significance of this principle thus lies not so
much in the autonomy that subsidiarity confers upon people.
Rather, it lies in the fact that this autonomy is essential if people
37. See THOMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA CONRA GENTILEs bk. III, pt. I, ch. 71, at
238-39 (Vernon J. Bourke trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1975).
38. Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Centesimus Annus 1 48 (May 1,
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are to choose freely any of the basic goods. Subsidiarity has
therefore less to do with the potential efficiency gains it may pro-
mote than with the need for people to engage in integral human
flourishing under their own volition-that is, through acting and
doing things for ourselves as the fruit of our own reflection,
choices, and acts, rather than having others do them for us. The
principle of subsidiarity also reminds us that there are numerous
free associations and communities that precede the state and
establish many of the conditions that assist people to achieve
perfection. They thus have a primary responsibility to give others
what they are objectively owed in justice.
A number of factors complicate the state's particular ability
to perform its assistance role. One is the knowledge problem.
Attempting to determine all the conditions that constitute a
political community's common good is a difficult exercise.
Though some elements are constant-such as the protection of
innocent life-the totality of these conditions is never static. The
state authorities cannot know everything about all the conditions
that constitute a political community's common good at any one
point in time. Governments, legislators, and judges are not, for
example, in a position to know the total, ever-changing number
and particular character of all the obligations incumbent upon
all individuals and associations in a given society. Another signif-
icant problem is the fact that the people occupying positions of
state authority are not perfect. They are as prone as anyone else
to making mistakes of acting outside their area of competence,
or even abusing their position for personal interest.
We thus face dilemmas. If we are to flourish as human
beings, we need to act under our own volition. Yet we cannot do
so if the state constantly preempts our decisions. On the other
hand, the absence of certain prerequisites that rely heavily upon
state authority for their efficacy, such as rule of law, may unrea-
sonably limit our opportunities for free choice.
When it comes to giving effect to health care rights, NNLT's
articulation of the reasons for limiting government power, espe-
cially as concretized through the principle of subsidiarity, appear
to suggest that proposals that seek to realize these rights practi-
cally exclusively through a state-administered system (such as
Britain's National Health Service) normally constitute a violation
of these principles. Of course, this leaves open the question of
the different ways in which the state might assist in the realiza-
tion of such rights. It does not exclude the possibility that, where
no other community is capable of fulfilling health care require-
ments, the state might have to meet directly certain essential
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needs.40 But an NNLT standpoint would in most circumstances
exclude as an option the state's assumption of near total control
of a given nation's health care system.
Instead, subsidiarity implies that the bulk of the state's con-
tribution to giving effect to a right to health care should be indi-
rect and, in many instances, quite remote. These might include
policies such as tax-breaks for health care research and the provi-
sion of health care services for those without any other means of
securing basic health care needs. More remote (albeit arguably
essential) contributions might include the provision of laws that
establish the basic requirements of public order, without which
any provisions of health care by private or public means is
extremely difficult. Another could be the state's maintenance of
a system of rule of law and enforcement of property rights and
contracts, without which free market-orientated approaches to
health care, for instance, could not function."
The same principles, however, suggest that efforts to give
effect to a positive right to health care ought to lie primarily with
those communities and associations that are closest to the person
in need. The first community, for example, that ought to
address the sickness of a child should be the child's family. It is
not the primary responsibility of state officials to ensure that a
child with a bad cold receives sufficient rest or that an elderly
person who has difficulty walking is able to go grocery shopping
so as to purchase sufficient supplies of food and medicine. But
as Christopher Tollefsen notes, "the state properly has within the
scope of its concern all persons within its borders. Consequently
it falls to the state to correct for the inevitable gaps in the scope
of concern of voluntary associations."" It follows that the state
40. For a discussion of the steps that the state may take to secure the
resources needed to fulfill its particular responsibilities to realizing negative
and positive rights to health care (including the implications for tax policy), see
Joseph Boyle, Fairness in Holdings: A Natural Law Account of Property and Welfare
Rights, in 18 SocIAL PHILOSOPHY & PoLIcY 206, 206-26 (2001). For an analysis
of the requirements of the different modes of justice (legal, distributive, and
commutative), see NATURAL LAw, supra note 7, at 16-93.
41. NNLT recognizes that a consideration of the empirical merits of dif-
ferent proposals is appropriate. In a case study of a moral dilemma related to
health care, Grisez underscores how the implementation of public health care
programs has produced significant dysfunctionalism in the provision of health
care as a result of such programs' distorting impact upon the workings of finan-
cial incentives on people's decision-making concerning their perception of
their needs and its relationship to the consumption and allocation of resources.
See 3 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESus: DIFFICULT MORAL QUES-
TIONs 417-18 (1997).
42. Christopher 0. Tollefsen, Welfare Rights vs. Welfare States, PUBLIC Dis.
COURSE (Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2008/11/110.
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may intervene directly, but only when it is clear there is no other
association or community in closer proximity to those with a par-
ticular health care need, or that all other associations and com-
munities have failed or proved unable to realize the need.
Moreover, even in those instances when the state appears to be
the only institution capable of meeting the need, the principle of
subsidiarity suggests that once a non-state community or associa-
tion has emerged which is capable of addressing the health care
need, then the state ought to begin devolving many of its respon-
sibilities to the new community or association (or to a commu-
nity that has recovered its capacity to meet the need). If the state
sought to remain in control or to exercise primary responsibili-
ties in light of such developments, then it would significantly
impede the capacity of individuals and communities to promote
or directly participate in the good of health, be it through
improving their own health or that of others. Tollefsen captures
the essence of the problem when he writes that "a state that
resists giving individuals the discretion to make these self-consti-
tuting choices as regards the identification and satisfaction of
their obligations removes from those individuals a key axis along
which they may shape themselves as the persons they should be.
Such a state seems, to that extent, unjust."4 3
CONCLUSION
Those seeking an explicit endorsement of any number of
specific systems of health care provisions from the perspective of
NNLT (or, for that matter, the viewpoint of any other natural law
theory) are likely to find disappointment instead. Even within
the parameters outlined above, NNLT allows considerable scope
for acts of determinatio. In part this reflects the practical reality
that, as Grisez observes, "[n]o system of paying for health care
adequately covers every person or every need for professional
help."" Nevertheless, NNLT does set parameters for assessing
any system that purports to actualize positive rights to health
care. It explicitly rules out outright collectivization of health care
in most circumstances, as well as any system that purports to deny
any role-even extremely remote-for the state in helping to
give effect to a positive health care right. The real significance,
however, of NNLT for debates about health care rights is that it
does provide coherent grounds for (1) identifying negative rights
flowing from the good of health, (2) affirming that there are pos-
itive health care rights derived from the same basic good, and (3)
43. Id.
44. Grisez, supra note 23, at 156.
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deriving a stable framework of principles to guide moral and pol-
icy reflection concerning how to realize both positive and nega-
tive rights in light of constraints, such as limited resources and
people's need to choose to participate in other fundamental
goods alongside the good of health.

